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Poking the Russian Bear:
The European Missile Defense Shield
By JEREMY ANDERSON

In December 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev resigned, the hammer and sickle was
lowered for the last time over Moscow, and
the USSR was dissolved. For the first time
in four decades America and Russia
breathed a sigh of relief—the Cold War was
over. Apparently though, Presidents George
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin never got the
memo.
Russian/U.S. relations have declined
during the past two years, to the point that
some scholars, such as Ariel Cohen, have
labeled the current situation a “cool war.”1
Both leaders predictably point the finger at
the other for this “cooling.” In truth, both
leaders are to blame.
The Bush Administration’s dogged
insistence on the European Missile Shield, a
costly program of marginal operational ability and marginal necessity, provokes Russia,
and is reminiscent of the Cold War mindset.
Putin frequently voices his displeasure with
this proposed shield, but when he states
that, “[It is] too early to speak of an end to
the arms race”2 as he did in a 2006 speech,
his rhetoric sounds like he lifted it from the
old Soviet playbook.
In addition to the rhetoric, Russia’s
recent actions too often mirror that of the
Soviet era. Putin portrays Russia as a facilitator of peace, a leader of the global community, and a promoter of human rights and
democracy. This is a difficult pill to swallow.
This is, after all, the same “democratic” Russia that recently turned off gas and oil supplies to Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus; fomented unrest in Georgia; violently crushed
its Chechen population; threatened to aim
its nuclear missiles at points from Paris to

Kiev; and has begun probing NATO defenses
with its long-range bombers. Compared with
the Soviet era, this may be a kinder, gentler
Russian bear, but it is a bear nonetheless—a
fact U.S. policymakers should not forget.
Although American officials publicly
deny that they are implementing the European Missile Shield with Russia in mind, the
proposed shield is to some extent, it seems, a
response to Russia’s recent actions. In truth,
the shield is only the newest wrinkle in a
long line of disagreements between the two
countries regarding eastward NATO expansion.
Russia, per its most recent National
Security Concept, views both eastward expansion of NATO and the positioning of military contingents near its borders as a threat.
According to Russia’s views, NATO expansion is not, as the West claims, the means to
promoting values of stability, personal liberty, democracy, and peace. It is instead an
explicit attempt to weaken Russia and
threaten its security. After all, NATO by its
very nature is a collective defense alliance.
To mask it as something else is an affront to
Russia’s intelligence, or so Russia avers.
Moscow can decry NATO expansion
all it likes, but it has no legitimate right to
prevent it. The Warsaw Pact is long dead,
and sovereign countries are entitled to petition for entrance into NATO and the security
it provides. Russia can, however, argue
against NATO establishing military installations in new NATO member states. In 1997,
the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations”
stipulated that NATO would not station permanent and substantial combat forces in new
member states. Furthermore, NATO secu63
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rity arrangements would not infringe upon
the sovereign rights of other states and shall
take into account their legitimate security
concerns.3
Moscow alleges that the United
States’ attempt to place a missile defense
shield in Poland as well as a complimentary
radar base in the Czech Republic is a breach
of this contract. The United States counters
with the semantic argument that one missile
defense shield, although permanent, is
hardly substantial, nor does this shield constitute a legitimate security concern for Russia as it is too small to undermine Russia’s
ballistic missile capabilities.
In 2007, Putin remarked, “If a new
missile defense system will be deployed in
Europe, then we need to warn you today that
we will come with a response.”4 Putin later
threatened to aim the Russian nuclear arsenal towards European targets. The United
States, never one to be bullied, pushed forward and inked an “agreement in principle”
with Poland to place the shield in Polish territory. Russia, never one to limit its displeasure to the rhetoric realm, buzzed a U.S. aircraft carrier in response—twice.
Not only does this shield have deleterious effects on Russian-American relations,
but the U.S. Congress has also criticized it
for its sizeable price tag of $76-$110 billion
and inconsistent results.5
The Missile Defense Agency’s Ground
Based Missile Defense (GMD) tests have
yielded mixed results. The theory behind
this defense is that an incoming enemy missile will hit the interceptor missile’s “kill vehicle” and explode upon impact. Tests so far
have raised doubts about the effectiveness of
this method—almost as many missiles get
past the kill vehicle as collide with it. As of
May 2007, only five out of nine tests were a
success.6 Defense experts often remark that
this type of defense is like "hitting a bullet
with a bullet."7
Furthermore, critics argue that these
tests are attempting to hit a bullet with a
bullet under ideal and controlled—and
therefore optimum—circumstances. Tests
are conducted with the “defender” knowing

the time of attack, the type of attacking missile, its trajectory and intended target, and
the makeup of its payload. This is not information an enemy would conveniently disclose. The Pentagon’s Office of the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation released
a statement in January 2006, which cautioned that the “flight tests still lack operational realism.”8
The other problem facing the missile
shield is that enemies can deploy counterdecoys to fool the missile shield. The simplest way to foil the shield is to overwhelm it
by firing more missiles than the defense can
intercept. The enemy could also deploy replica decoys, disguise the warhead among debris from the exploded booster rocket, jam
the signaling radar, and more.
The Patriot Ground Based System is
the one missile defense system that has
worked, albeit not always to perfection. Designed to protect U.S. troops from Iraqi
Scuds, the Patriot Defense System got off to
an ignominious start in the Persian Gulf
War. It failed in most or all of its Scud engagements even though the enemy employed
no obvious counter-measures. In Desert
Storm, the U.S. Army fired 158 Patriot missiles at 47 Scud missiles but “hit no more
than four, and possibly hit none.”9 It performed significantly better in 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom, intercepting all enemy
missiles within range. Unfortunately, it also
intercepted a British RAF Tornado, a Navy
F-18, and an Airforce F-16, killing three pilots.
Even if the missile shield worked
properly the United States and NATO have
not presented a convincing argument as to
why it is necessary. U.S. officials insist the
shield is intended to protect American interests and allies from rogue states, and even
then, could only prevent a limited attack of
one or two “unsophisticated” missiles. The
European missile shield could not defend the
continent against a large-scale attack like
the one Russia could launch—a point U.S.
officials willingly concede. NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is of like
mind: "Ten interceptors cannot and will not
64
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Missile Shield would protect America’s allies
from North Korean missiles. North Korea
has become markedly less menacing in recent months since Pyongyang promised to
dismantle the country’s nuclear program.
North Korea may not possess nuclear weapons but it does possess short-range missiles,
which it demonstrated by firing a Taepodong-1 over Japan’s bow in 1998.
It is also widely believed that North
Korea possesses a long-range Taepodong-2
that is capable of reaching the United
States. This would be less worrisome if Kim
Jong-Il had not threatened a “relentless, annihilating strike” in response to any U.S.
preemptive strike against his missiles,
which he conveniently likes to test without
diverging the flight trajectory or landing
zone.15 Still, it is unclear how a missile
shield in Europe protects the American continent, or America’s ally Japan, from a North
Korean missile.
Furthermore, if a rogue state wanted
to detonate a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) in Europe, it would not likely choose
to deliver this weapon via ballistic missiles,
even if it had the capability. Sending a missile is the equivalent of sending a calling
card. In this age of terrorism, missiles are
not the weapon of choice because it is too
easy to link the missile back to the offending
agent(s). Car bombs, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), airplanes, and rocketpropelled grenades are the preferred weapons. The missile defense shield would be useless against these types of attacks.
The United States’ dogged insistence
on this European shield is troubling. America is spending billions of dollars per year on
a system that may or may not work, to guard
against a threat that likely does not exist.
What is known for certain, though, is that
this missile shield is provoking Russia at a
time when the United States can ill afford
another enemy.
Other actions can deter a rogue country from firing a missile at U.S. targets. Ultimately, humanity, not technology, will act as
the greatest deterrent against potential enemies. As former Assistant Secretary of De-

affect the strategic balance and 10 interceptors can also not pose a threat to Russia.”10
These statements have done little to
assuage Moscow’s fears. Russia is confident
that it could overwhelm one shield right
now. It is, however, worried that one shield
will open the door to an entire global system
of shields that would undermine its nuclear
capabilities. U.S. officials insist, at least
publicly, that they have no plans for a global
missile defense system. The most recent U.S.
National Security Strategy explicitly states
that the missile shield is designed to protect
its European allies from a nuclear threat
from rogue states, specifically Iran and
North Korea.11
Putin is not buying this claim. The
Kremlin believes that Russia, not Iran, is
the target of this shield because Iran does
not have nuclear missile capabilities—a
point substantiated by the recent National
Intelligence Estimate.12 As Putin remarked,
“We are being told the anti-missile defense
system is targeted against something that
does not exist. Doesn't it seem funny to
you?"13
The U.S. intelligence community is
not laughing; it believes Iran’s ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the
Middle East. Iran possesses several hundred
foreign short range Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, as well as their own Zelzal, Samid, and
Fateh missiles. The centerpiece of their ballistic missile effort is the Shahab-3, which
supposedly has a range of 1200m, placing
Israel and southeastern Europe easily
within reach. It is also rumored that Iran
possess the Shahab-5 (2,500 mile range), and
an ICBM dubbed Kowsar.14
If Iran were to fire these missiles,
and we are to believe Iranian Presidents
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, Israel would
be a more likely target than Europe. A missile shield in Poland, though, would not protect Israel. Since Iran is much closer to Israel than Poland the interceptor missile
would never reach Iran’s missile in time.
The proposed shield would not even protect
fellow NATO member Turkey.
It is also unclear how a European
65
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ability, is doing. America should abandon
this pursuit as a sign of good faith towards
the Russian Federation. Currently, there is
no need for such a shield and, ironically,
building the shield may actually necessitate
the need for one, a classic example of the security dilemma. This is a point too many policy makers and politicians have overlooked.
Rudy Giuliani, for one, recently remarked,
“The best answer to Putin would be a substantial increase in the size of our military."17
A military buildup is the wrong approach. It was precisely this military oneups-manship that fueled the Cold War in the
first place. And despite what Bush and Putin
may believe, the Cold War is over—the
United States won, it does not need to fight
it again. Abandoning the European Missile
Shield is one way to prevent the return of
another Cold War. American children already have to remove their shoes at the airport; should they really have to practice the
duck-and-cover under their desks again?

fense Philip Coyle remarked, “Dollar for dollar, [our diplomats] are the most costeffective missile defense system the United
States ever had.”16 Americans should take
comfort because this approach has worked
before. After all, diplomacy, not a preventative military strike, brought the Cuban missile crisis to an end. Likewise, the Cold War
was not won solely through arms races, military displays of force and proxy wars. Diplomacy was equally as important in achieving
victory.
Russia, more than ever, is an important ally for the United States. The United
States needs Russia to stay within the fold
and not facilitate Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It
also needs Russia’s help in the War on Terror, especially as the North Caucasus and
Central Asia have become more radicalized.
The United States should look for ways to
engage Russia, not enrage it.
Unfortunately, this is what the European missile shield, a costly program of marginal necessity and marginal operational
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